Can the Peace Be Imported? by Azam, Jean-Paul
  
 
July 18, 2005 
(Revised Version) 
 
 
Can the Peace be Imported? 
 
by Jean-Paul Azam 
 
University of Toulouse (ARQADE and IDEI) 
and Institut Universitaire de France. 
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down its weapons. Cases are analyzed where the foreign power rationally decides to intervene 
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for avoiding to leave this side defenseless, or the promise of aid as an incentive to reduce the 
probability of looting. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Thirteen peace agreements were signed by the warlords during the Liberian civil war, 
and failed to be implemented for six years. Adebajo (2002) explains these repeated failures by 
“the proliferation of armed factions and the manipulation of ethnic rivalries and plundering of 
resources by rival warlords” (Adebajo, 2002, p.17). For the rational choice theorist, these 
explanations fail to provide an adequate answer to the question of why these agreements were 
signed in the first place, and repeatedly so. The presence of armed factions, of ethnic rivalries, 
and of alluvial diamonds did not change significantly during that period of six years. These 
were known to all from the beginning of the Liberian civil war. Moreover, these failures 
occurred while an international force drawn from various West African states, the ECOMOG, 
was present in the country. Nigeria was the dominant power in control of ECOMOG, from the 
beginning, while Ghana also played episodically a significant part. This raises the additional 
question of why this international force intervened at all, and why did it fail to make any 
progress towards peace during those six years. An important clue for answering these queries 
is provided by a remarkable event. In September 1990, one of the rebel warlords, Prince 
Johnson, captured the incumbent dictator Samuel Doe within the premises of the ECOMOG’s 
headquarters (Adebajo, 2002). He then videotaped the latter’s torture and murder, and 
exposed publicly the body for all to see. This event simply revealed to all what most of the 
actors knew with a high probability: the ECOMOG was not credible as a protector for any of 
the parties involved. Then, the repeated demands for disarmaments of the rebels, which were 
included in all the thirteen still-born cease-fires, were probably perceived by all as a request to 
volunteer for committing suicide.  
 Then, in September 1996, the peace accord that led eventually to the peaceful July 
1997 elections were signed in Abuja (Nigeria), despite the continued presence of armed 
factions, ethnic rivalries, and alluvial diamonds to be plundered. Two main changes seem to 
explain why a credible peace became possible. First, the Nigerian government (i.e. General 
Sani Abacha) had at long last identified the relevant “government” for post-conflict Liberia, 
namely Charles Taylor. Before that, the Nigerians had clearly chosen to support the loosing 
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side, thus delaying any credible peace settlement. This choice was probably made for the sake 
of fairness, as Charles Taylor was clearly the aggressor, and was somehow regarded more as a 
highway man than as a legitimate political contender. Second, the ECOMOG’s forces became 
credible thanks to the logistical support provided eventually by the USA and the EU, which 
had declined to get involved at the beginning. The changed attitude of the latter was not 
necessarily exogenous, and was probably prompted by the emergence of a clear strategy to 
establish the peace. Nevertheless, this suggests that the warlords were using the repeated 
cease-fire negotiations as means for gathering information and testing the evolving credibility 
of the peace-keeping forces. Signing those unsatisfactory cease fires was probably just a 
polite way of ending the meetings, in order to go back to the warfare business without wasting 
any more time. This information-gathering process reached a conclusion when all the players 
had identified an acceptable outcome, while the credibility of the intervention forces had at 
long last become convincing. It turned out that the peace only lasted for a while, and violence 
resumed later on, as Charles Taylor became excessively predatory when he was in power, 
while the peace-keeping forces had shrunk significantly. 
 Neighboring Sierra Leone offers quite a different picture of the potential effects of a 
foreign intervention, not to mention Charles Taylor’s intervention from neighboring Liberia, 
which was clearly not aimed at establishing the peace. First of all, ECOMOG chose the right 
“government” to bet on. Elections were held in February 1996, under international pressure, 
and brought Ahmed Kabbah to power. Under pressure from the IMF, Kabbah had to cut 
defense expenditures, despite the pervasive political violence, and was quite predictably 
toppled by a coup in May 1997 (Adebajo, 2002). Then, the Nigerian troops of the ECOMOG 
restored their credibility, by flushing out the rebels from Freetown, for restoring Kabbah to 
power in March 1998. Its credibility was also enhanced by the support provided by Britain, 
the former colonial power, as well as by the presence of various mercenary firms. After a last 
and unsuccessful attempt by the rebels to take over the capital city in January 1999, the Lomé 
agreements were signed in July 1999. They failed to establish the peace, however, as Nigeria 
withdrew its forces in the wake of the return to civilian rule, under president Obasanjo. Then, 
fighting resumed, until the UN had replaced ECOMOG as a credible force. This took some 
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time, as this UN force was initially humiliated by the rebels, in May 2000. Credibility was 
then repaired by involving more Nigerian soldiers, and some British intervention and 
continuous support. Disarmament of the rebels at long last occurred in January 2002.  
 The changing attitude of the Nigerian government, pulling out from the Mano River 
region after the return to civilian rule in 1999 under former General Obasanjo, raises an 
interesting issue. Obviously, this external intervention in Liberia and Sierra Leone on behalf 
of ECOWAS was fairly costly for the Nigerian government, and it is quite plausible that a 
higher political payoff was expected initially. Then, one possible explanation is that Obasanjo 
was more sensitive than the previous rulers to the cost of this operation, being democratically 
under the taxpayers’ control, and more realistic about the benefit that Nigeria could reap from 
it. He did not need to deflect international pressure against his dictatorial rule, as did Abacha. 
However, a more subtle explanation could be that Obasanjo was feeling more secure than 
Sani Abacha and the other generals, because of the clear democratic backing acquired through 
the elections. Then, according to this interpretation, he did not need to keep the potential 
military trouble makers at bay, like his predecessors did. Hence, according to this view, Sani 
Abacha would have maneuvered to keep the dangerous generals busy abroad, with some 
obvious material rewards involving higher pay, easy corruption, and some exciting action to 
perform. However, this does not explain the gradual rapprochement between Abacha and 
Charles Taylor that led eventually to the effective cease fire. Hence, a simpler story about 
Abacha gradually discovering Charles Taylor’s credible commitment and material ability not 
to disarm, whatever the pressure, may well be sufficient. Such a credible commitment was 
obviously making him the natural post-conflict ruler for Nigeria, as the government of a 
peaceful country is most of the time keeping the monopoly over the holding of weapons. 
Once all the actors had acquired this piece of information, then finding an acceptable peace 
agreement was relatively easy. It was just a matter of finding the right level of investment in 
peace-keeping for providing enough security to the disarming side. In Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, as seen above, the support by the USA or Britain was probably pivotal, when it came. 
 Credibility problems are also at the core of the failed ECOMOG intervention in 
neighboring Guinea-Bissau. There, the incumbent President Vieira was toppled by his 
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opponent General Mane under the very nose of the ECOMOG forces (Adebajo, 2002). Then, 
the latter left the country, because there was only one side left. Hence, the three interventions 
by ECOMOG in West Africa involved the ousting of the incumbent president, Doe and 
Vieira, under the intervener’s very nose, the former getting killed, while the third intervention 
involved the restoration of the democratically elected Kabbah to power, after he was ousted 
by a coup. This is not a highly convincing series, which could enhance the credibility of such 
a peace-building intervention. More generally, it may legitimately raise some doubts about the 
value of such an intervention. The present paper focuses on the role played by this type of 
credibility, concerning the protection of the disarming side. 
 An interesting example of credible peace settlement is offered by the experience of 
Chad in the early 1990s (see Azam and Djimtoingar, 2004, and references therein). Idriss 
Déby took over at the end of more than twenty years of civil war, of variable intensity, 
involving at times French and Libyian interventions. He put an end to the “Codo” rebellion in 
the south, by combining a blood bath in 1993 with a credible offer of power sharing. A 
National Conference was organized the same year, for venting the demands of the different 
groups, and establishing some form of dialog. The main point of his strategy was that he took 
General Kamougué, the leader of the Southerners’ rebellion, as President of the National 
Assembly. This is formerly the second-ranking position in government. With a view to avoid 
making this position a purely honorific one, Déby did not dismantle the military units 
composed of southerners, which remained clearly available should Kamougué decide to 
mobilize them for resuming the fighting. This clearly put a credible cap on the level of 
taxation or looting of the southerners that Déby was able to perform with impunity in the 
peaceful regime. The resulting credible restraint played a key role in maintaining peace in that 
country, despite the new opportunities opened by the beginning of oil revenues in 2003. 
 The present paper is an attempt at clarifying the role of credibility in peace keeping. 
More precisely, it provides a theoretical exploration that aims at capturing some stylized facts 
about foreign intervention in civil wars. One obvious point is that peace would only be 
achieved if some form of security could be guaranteed to the warring parties, were they to lay 
down their weapons. This is the key issue, which might be viewed differently by the 
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government and the rebels. Both sides must be convinced that accepting peace would not 
reduce their expected welfare, relative to war. Most cease fires are broken because the parties 
refuse to surrender their weapons, for fear of being exposed defenseless to an attack by the 
other side. Second, a major fact to be taken on board is that many foreign interventions fail to 
secure peace, and leave the intervener with a major political loss, if the latter leaves the 
country in the wake of a failure. This is reminiscent of the failed intervention of the USA in 
Somalia, for example. This risk of failure is thus a crucial feature to be included in a model 
aimed at explaining foreign intervention. In the model used below, the risk of such failed 
interventions is explained by asymmetric information between the local actors and the foreign 
intervener. Hence, this model is based on rational expectations, and does not invoke any type 
of excess optimism or biased expectations. For example, it entails that it was possibly rational 
for the USA to intervene in Somalia, given the available knowledge concerning the local 
actors that was available at the time.  
 The model is presented in the next section, and it is used in the subsequent three 
sections for discussing various equilibria where the foreign intervention may or may not be 
successful. Section 3 focuses on a restricted definition of peace making, where full 
disarmament of the rebels is regarded as the objective of the intervention. In the real world, 
disarmament is obsessively required in all cease fire negotiations. However, it is also the main 
tumbling block that makes so many of these agreements a hopeless ritual. Section 4 discusses 
the potential for a less restrictive definition of peace, where the rebel forces are required to 
redeploy, and disarm only partially, rather than to disarm entirely. This makes peace easier to 
enforce, even in cases where the foreign power would be discouraged to intervene if full 
disarmament was the aim of the exercise. Section 5 discusses the potential for aid as an 
incentive for the government to refrain from predating ex post, and thus to make intervention 
more probably successful. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
 
 The model used here for discussing the issue of foreign intervention aimed at stopping 
the fighting in a civil war is a variant of Azam and Mesnard (2003). Like the latter, it 
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emphasizes the commitment capacity of the incumbent government as the crucial factor that 
determines whether unarmed peace is an equilibrium outcome or not1. However, in order to 
customize the model to the case of a post-conflict situation, the credibility at stake is that of 
the government’s promise to refrain from a predatory behavior after the rebels have disarmed. 
Moreover, the group in power might not necessarily be the “historical government”, which 
ruled the country before the war started. The incumbent government referred to in this model 
could simply be the recent victor of some important battle, which gave it the control of the 
capital city, as well as some good prospects of remaining in control should the fighting go on. 
For example, the Liberian civil war came to an end in 1997, only after the ECOMOG 
identified correctly Charles Taylor as the relevant “government”, while the latter only became 
president later on, by winning the elections. Before that, the foreign intervention did not 
provide even the beginning of a peaceful solution, because it had failed to get the casting 
right. In other words, the “government” is defined here as the side that will not disarm in case 
of peace. As discussed in the introductory section, it is this commitment that defines the post-
conflict ruling side. 
What matters for the model presented below, as in the seminal model of Grossman 
(1991), is that the two contending groups are not treated symmetrically. One of them is due to 
be in power should the conflict end under the influence of the foreign intervention. What 
gives this side the key part in the post-conflict situation is the assumed credible commitment 
not to disarm even in case of peace. This is what “the government” refers to in the following 
model. Hence, the latter can also be interpreted as a model of a foreign intervention aimed at 
shortening an ongoing civil war by convincing one side, hereafter called the rebels, to admit 
defeat and let the other side establish a peaceful government. The latter is defined in the 
standard way as having the monopoly over the possible use of weapons in peace time. The 
issue of what makes the government’s commitment not to disarm credible is not addressed 
hereafter. In the case of Liberia, Charles Taylor had acquired a solid reputation of 
invincibility, by having bounced back several times from awkward positions, recovering 
easily from any setback that he had to face. He had also managed to mobilize a significant 
                                                 
1 The classic discussion of how commitment matters for limiting conflict is of course Schelling (1960). 
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popular support in the zones under his control, as well as sizable financial means. The other 
side was not is such a good position, with little popular support, uncertain finances, and no 
obvious unity of purpose or action. This configuration of strength and weaknesses probably 
played an important part in convincing Sani Abacha that Charles Taylor was the right guy to 
talk to. Building a convincing theory of how this type of commitment not to disarm is made 
credible is left for future research. 
 The Costs and Benefits of Conflict 
 The assumed technology of conflict, which determines the probability of toppling the 
government as a function of the relative forces engaged in the fighting by the two sides, is the 
same as in Azam and Mesnard (2003). However, we start from a situation where the fighting 
is already on, and we thus assume that the government has engaged a given level of forces 
GF , which we assume irreversible, for the sake of simplicity. This value could be determined 
by a scale effect in the fighting technology, as assumed in Azam and Mesnard (2003). The 
rebels have engaged a level of forces µGR FF = , where 0>µ  measures their relative 
efficiency at fighting This level of forces gives them a probability 10 <<ψ  to topple the 
government if the war goes on. In such a case, the rebel group gets the benefit of the 
remaining government’s resources: 0>− GG Fy γ . The latter is the difference between the 
government’s initial resources Gy  and the cost of running the army GFγ . The parameter 
γ captures the unit cost of the military. Recent accounts of the cost of running an army in 
Africa have emphasized the high level of corruption involved, which makes the military 
socially very costly (e.g. Howe, 2001). Otherwise, if the rebels’ bid for power fails, these 
resources remain in the government’s hands. If 1>µ , the rebels are more efficient at fighting 
than the government’s army, and vice versa. Then, the focus of the analysis is on the 
conditions to be fulfilled for the rebels to disarm, i.e. to switch to a level of forces 0=RF , if 
they are offered a peaceful settlement. If they gave up their weapons unilaterally, not as part 
of a peace settlement, they would simply loose the war with probability 1, and fall prey to the 
government’s predatory behavior. 
 The willingness of the rebels to disarm depends on the government’s ability to refrain 
from predation were they to give up the fighting and lay down their weapons. This can be 
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captured in a simple fashion by the following looting technology. In case of war, the 
government collects a tribute T from the rebel group with probability 1 if it wins the war and 
with probability 0 if it is defeated. This parameter may be interpreted either as the resources 
looted by the army in case of victory, or as the revenue collected by a more orderly form of 
taxation, depending on the level of organization of the government and its control over its 
own army. In case of peace, defined here to imply disarmament of the insurgents, the rebel 
group is in a weak position, being in fact defenseless. Its fate would then depend on the 
commitment technology available to the government. Let π denote the probability of a 
predatory behavior by the government. This is clearly a measure of the level of “fear” 
experienced by the rebel group. Then, in a post-conflict situation where the rebels have given 
up their weapons, the government is assumed to levy T with probability π , and to refrain 
from collecting any loot with probability π−1 .2 In other words, the difference between war 
and peace when the rebels are disarmed is that the probability of looting by the winner falls 
from 1 in case of war to π  in case of peace. The value of this crucial probability is assumed 
to depend on the behavior of a foreign power, which may intervene with a view to stop the 
fighting. Hence, the intervener is here modeled as an “agency of restraint” (Collier, 1991). Its 
behavior is described below, after spelling out the conditions for a disarmed peace situation to 
be acceptable by both warring parties. 
 The Participation Constraints of the Two Sides 
 Let us first analyze the condition under which the rebels will accept to disarm, if they 
are offered peace in return for disarmament by the foreign intervener. Given the conflict 
technology sketched above, as well as the looting technology just presented, the rebels will 
accept to disarm if the following participation constraint holds: 
 
( ) ( )TFyFyTy GGGRR ψγψµπ −−−+−≥− 1 .    (1) 
 
 The term on the left-hand side is the expected value of the rebel group’s net income in 
case of peace, given the expected value of the tribute that may be collected by the 
                                                 
2 A possible alternative interpretation is that π measures the share of the country that the ruler would loot in case 
of peace. I am indebted to Steve Saideman for this interpretation. 
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government. The right-hand side is composed of three terms. The first one 
µGG Fy − represents their own resources remaining after diverting the forces µGR FF =  
from production for the sake of fighting. The second term ( )GG Fy γψ −  represents the 
expected value of the take from the government in case of victory, while the last one, 
( )Tψ−− 1 , measures the expected loss to looting, in case of defeat. Some simple algebra 
allows to rewrite this participation constraint (1) as: 
 
 
( )
T
F
T
Ty GG
µ
ψγµψπ +++−≤ 11 .     (2) 
 
 Define Rπ as the right-hand side of (2), i.e. the upper bound on π beyond which the 
rebels will not lay down their weapons. Condition (2) has a simple intuitive interpretation. It 
means that the rebels will only accept to take a chance at disarming if this reduces 
significantly the probability of being looted by the government’s army. Moreover, the upper 
limit on this probability depends on the level of the forces already engaged by the 
government. This affects the relative attraction of war and peace for the rebels via two 
channels. First, the higher the size of the government’s army, the more resources must the 
rebels divert from production for having a chance of toppling the government by fighting. 
Conversely, this affects the “peace dividend” that they can get by laying down their weapons, 
as a larger workforce can then go back to production. Second, the larger the share of the 
government’s resources engaged in the military, the lower the remaining prize to be gained in 
case of victory. Therefore, the high level of the government’s forces works as a deterrent, 
which might make peace preferable for the potential rebels, even if the probability of being 
looted when disarmed is quite high. This upper bound on the probability of being looted by 
the government if the conflict ends also depends on µ , the rebels’ relative efficiency at 
fighting. The lower the latter, the more costly is the continuation of fighting for them, as a 
larger number of soldiers must then be diverted from production. May be, this parameter 
allows this model to explain a phenomenon like the impact of Savimbi’s death on the peace 
settlement in Angola. He was probably playing a key part in determining the UNITA’s ability 
Jean-Paul Azam : Imported Peace 10
to fight, by his strategic vision. Then, his officers probably recognized his death as a 
significant downward shift in µ . 
 The rebel group’s participation constraint just described yields the upper limit on the 
probability of predation by the government that the rebels are prepared to accept if they are to 
disarm. However, the government is facing an incentive working in the opposite direction: 
peace must promise at least as much as war does if the latter is to be ended. This is the 
government’s participation constraint. Given the level of GF , the government would get an 
expected payoff of GG FTy γπ −+  in case of peace, while war promises 
( )( )GG FTy γψ −+−1 . Therefore, the incumbent government will accept a peace accord if 
the former is larger than the latter, which is the case if: 
 
 1 G G G R
y T F
T T
ψ γ
π ψ π π+≥ − + = < .      (3) 
 
 It is easily checked that the lower bound on π spelt out in (3), denoted Gπ , lies 
entirely below the upper bound on π  given by (2). Hence, there exists a non-empty set of 
values of π  that are compatible with a peace accord accepted by the two parties, for any 
given 0>GF . This range is increasing in GF  as (2) and (3) can be used to find: 
R G GF Tπ π µ− = . Outside this range, either the government or the rebels will reject the 
accord, and prefer getting on with the fighting. It is assumed that all the parameters of the 
model are common knowledge for the two parties involved in the fight, so that no game of 
deception can be played: given { }GF,π , each player can figure out whether the latter falls 
within the range where disarmed peace is acceptable to both parties or outside. Then, the 
rebels will not disarm unless (2) and (3) hold simultaneously, implying that the government 
will genuinely stop the fighting and accept the peace agreement also. 
 Now, the foreign intervener must be introduced in the model, in order to determine (i) 
under what conditions it will actually intervene, and (ii) how successful this intervention will 
be. As suggested by Regan (2002.a), a basic criterion for evaluating success is whether the 
fighting is stopped as a response of this intervention. We take first disarmament of the rebels 
as the criterion for judging whether fighting is really stopped, as is customary in this 
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literature. This requires that the intervener manages to influence the probability of predation 
π  in such a way that [ ]RG πππ ,∈ . However, this requirement is hardly distinguishable to the 
outside observer from the requirement that no looting occurs after disarmament. Hence, we 
assume below that the intervener will only reap the whole political benefit of the intervention 
if both criteria are fulfilled: (i) disarmament of the insurgents is achieved, and (ii) looting does 
not occur. The subsequent section discusses a weaker definition of peace, where 
redeployment of the rebels’ forces is required, instead of disarmament.   
 
3. Outside Intervention for Disarmament 
 
 Assume now that a foreign power can intervene in the conflict described above, with a 
view to stop the fighting and achieve disarmament. To achieve this goal, the intervener 
invests an amount I > 0, endogenously determined, with a view to affect the probability of 
predation in case of disarmament. This foreign power values peace, and gets a political 
reward worth V if (i) disarmament of the insurgents is achieved, and (ii) this does not trigger 
any acts of predation by the government. Moreover, we assume that the information that the 
intervener has about the ability of the local government to commit to refraining from 
predation is not as accurate as the one that the local players possess. This assumption of 
asymmetric information plays a crucial part in producing some possible equilibria where the 
foreign power intervenes, but is unable to secure disarmament with probability 1, for some 
parameter values. In other words, the following exercise shows that asymmetric information 
is probably the root cause that makes foreign intervention a risky business. 
 Intervention and the Probability of Predation 
 The simplest model that captures both of these two assumptions that (i) the 
intervener’s investment is liable to reduce the government’s probability of predation in case of 
disarmament, and (ii) there is asymmetric information about the latter, is as follows. Assume 
that for any given level of the intervener’s investment I the probability of predation by the 
government can only take two values, given by the following functions: 
 
 ILL αθπ −= , with probability ν , 
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and 
 IHH αθπ −= , with probability ν−1 , 
where: 
 HL θθ < . 
 
 Call the latter parameters the government’s propensity to predate. This is not just 
related to some personal characteristics of the ruler, but could also depend on some 
institutional characteristics of the country at war. In particular, this could depend on the 
checks and balances that would restrain the ability of the government to adopt a predatory 
behavior in case of peace. Then, the foreign intervention is reducing the government’s 
probability of predation below its propensity to do so, as 0>α . This captures the idea of the 
foreign intervener as an “agency of restraint”, as mentioned above. 
Now, the expected benefit that the intervener gets from its action depends on where 
about the latter two probabilities fall relative to the disarmament range determined in the 
previous section. Table 1 gives a description of the possible cases. The intervener only gets a 
positive expected benefit from the intervention if at least one of the two probabilities just 
described falls within the relevant range, as described in table 1. Otherwise, the expected 
benefit is zero. Comparing this to the positive cost I of investing in the intervention, we can 
conclude that the intervention will not take place in the latter cases.  
 
Table 1: The Expected Benefit of Intervention 
 
 GH ππ <  RHG πππ ≤≤  HR ππ <  
GL ππ <  0 ( )( )VHπν −− 11  0 
RLG πππ ≤≤  Void ( )( )VHL πνπν −−− 11 ( )VLπν −1  
LR ππ <  Void Void 0 
 
 Intervention with a Risk of Failure 
 There is no point in working out all the possible cases, and it is more interesting to 
focus only on some cases for illustrating the mechanics of the model. Let us focus first on the 
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middle case of the top row of table 1. In this equilibrium, which requires some conditions 
described below, the intervener reaps the benefit of its investment only if the government 
happens to be of the H-type, i.e. with a high propensity to predate. Otherwise, the probability 
of predation is too low for making peace worthwhile for the government. This case can be an 
equilibrium outcome under the following set of sufficient conditions. 
 Assume first that RHGL πθπθ <<< . It is readily checked that this entails that the 
equilibrium analyzed here, with an intervention that only secures disarmament if the 
government is of the H-type, can only exist if: 
 
 

 −
∈
α
πθ GHI ,0 .        (4) 
 
 
Figure 1: Determination of the H-Type-Only Equilibrium. 
 
 Otherwise, Hπ  would fall outside of the relevant range. Figure 1 illustrates how 
condition (4) may be derived. If we assume in addition that: 
 
 
ν
α
−
>
1
1V ,         (5) 
 
Rπ  
Hθ  
Gπ  
Lθ  
H Gθ π
α
−
I  
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then I will be chosen at the upper end of the range identified in (4). This is because in this 
case, the expected profit reaped by the intervener is: 
 
 ( )( ) IVIH −+−− αθν 11 , 
 
which is increasing in I, within the relevant range, if (5) holds. Notice that this condition 
requires that the intervener gets a high value V of the political benefit of intervention, and that 
the latter is highly effective in exerting restraint on the government’s predatory behavior. This 
condition is also made less stringent if the probability of the government being of the H-type 
is high enough, making the right-hand side of (5) small enough.  
 Substituting for equilibrium I in the expression above for the intervener’s profit, we 
find the latter to be: 
 
 ( )( )
α
πθ
πν GHG V
−
−−− 11 .       (6) 
 
 This is necessarily positive under (5). 
 To summarize this exercise, we have found a simple example where the foreign power 
will intervene, although such action is not certain to achieve disarmament with probability 1. 
Even when the latter is achieved, the adoption of some predatory action by the government 
remains possible, with a non zero probability. However, the intervention is made worthwhile 
ex ante for the foreign power by the fact that the latter is quite efficient at reducing the 
damage done by the government if the latter happens to be of the worst type, with a high 
propensity to predate in case of peace. Otherwise, if the government happens to be of a milder 
type, the probability of predation left after the intervention is too small for compensating it 
from the expected gains from the war. Hence, the government would then prefer to carry on 
with the latter. This equilibrium would be chosen only if the latter type was assigned a 
relatively low probability. 
 Other Cases of Intervention 
 From table 1, it can be checked that  intervention can also occur in this model while 
disarmament will only occur if the government is of the L-type, in the middle cell of the right-
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hand column, or when disarmament occurs with probability 1, in the middle cell of the table. 
The analysis of these two cases can be sketched as follows. 
A simple instance of the former case occurs if R Lπ θ< . Then, the intervener’s political 
profit function is: 
 
 ( )1 L I V Iν θ α− + − . 
 
The foreign power intervenes with a level of investment ( )L RI θ π α= − , provided 
1Vα ν< . This low investment level entails that disarmament only occurs with probability ν , 
if the government is of the L-type3. Figure 2 illustrates how this equilibrium is found. 
 
 
Figure 2: Determination of the L-Type-Only Equilibrium. 
 
What makes such a case worthwhile ex ante for the intervener is that the required 
investment level is pretty cheap, while the risk of war being continued, if the government 
happened to be of the H-type, is pretty low. In the latter case, disarmed peace would be 
                                                 
3 It can be checked that the following two conditions: (i) 1 2ν ≥ , and (ii) ( )1
L R
R
V θ πα
ν π
−
>
−
, are sufficient for 
ensuring that the equilibrium described in figure 2 is preferred to the other possible outcomes, where the cease 
fire is only signed if the government happens to be of the H-type, as in the previous example. 
Rπ  
Hθ  
Gπ  
Lθ  
L Rθ π
α
−
I  
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rejected by the rebels, because the probability of predation by the government would be too 
high in this case. Hence, this is the polar case to the previous one, insofar as there, the peace 
agreement was rejected by the government, while here it is the rebels that prevent the peace 
settlement from happening despite the external intervention.  
 A less risky decision is made by the foreign power when RLHG πθθπ <−+  and 
LG θπ < . Then, it can be checked that the following conditions are sufficient for the outcome 
depicted at figure 3 to be an equilibrium: 
 
 ( )
1
1 1
H R
H L R
Vθ π α
ν θ θ π ν
− ≤ <
− + − − ∆
, where 1H L G
R L
θ θ π
π π
− + −∆ =
−
, 
and: 
 1ν < ∆ . 
 
 
Figure 3: A Certain-Cease-Fire Equilibrium. 
 
Then, the foreign power invests ( )H RI θ π α= − , and gets disarmament with 
probability 1 instead. Here, the difference with the previous case is that the rebels are 
prepared to put up with a higher probability of predation. This could be due for example to a 
lower value of µ , as can be seen from (2), which would make war more expensive in terms 
Rπ  
Hθ  
Gπ  
Lθ  
H Rθ π
α
−
I  
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of resources diverted from production. Their relative weakness at fighting induces them to 
accept a higher probability of predation in case of disarmed peace. Then, the intervener is 
prepared to invest the same amount as in the previous case, even if its political reward or its 
effectiveness at reducing the probability of predation are weaker, simply because it has a 
higher probability of success. 
It would be easy to produce other examples, but the three cases described above are 
sufficient for illustrating the mechanics of the model. The most important point that emerges 
from these exercises is that it can be rational for the foreign power to intervene even if it faces 
the prospect of failing to obtain disarmament with a non-zero probability. Notice in addition 
that Gπ  and Rπ  are both increasing functions of GF , as seen above with (2) and (3). Hence, 
the outcome could be made dependent on the intensity of the fighting. One could for example 
generate equilibria where intervention secures disarmament, when GF  is low, and others 
where intervention would not occur, for high values of GF . This comparative static prediction 
is reminiscent of Regan’s empirical results (Regan, 2002.a), which suggest that intervention is 
more likely when the intensity of the fighting is not too high. Here, the foreign power will not 
intervene if GH πθ < , which could be caused by a too high value of GF . 
The next section shows that the set of parameter values for which the foreign power 
intervenes is enlarged if we do not insist on a complete disarmament of the rebels, but choose 
a redeployment strategy instead. 
 
4. Opting for Armed Peace 
 
 Part of the difficulty encountered in the previous section comes from the inclusion of a 
strict disarmament clause in our definition of peace. In fact, there is another solution, whereby 
the former rebels are required to contribute to their own security in peace time. This is a 
special case of the so-called “power-sharing” solution. As mentioned in the introduction, this 
is related to the solution adopted by Idriss Déby in Chad, who did not dismantle the units of 
the army comprised of soldiers from the defeated southerner side. He took General 
Kamougué, the former leader of the southerners’ army during the civil war as president of the 
national assembly, which is formally the second-ranking position in government. That way, 
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Déby was making sure that the Southerners had some means to fight back in case of need, 
with a clear command structure headed by Kamougué, as a way to convince them of his 
commitment to leave them in peace. A similar solution was chosen by the Tigrayans when 
they won the war against the Derg regime in Ethiopia, in 1991. Many of the soldiers and 
officers of the defeated army were maintained in the military, while the demobilized ones 
have kept their rank and pension rights, and could be re-mobilized easily. By contrast, a large 
number of the victorious fighters were simply ordered to go back to their homeland with very 
little personal advantage (Azam, 1995). The signal was thus sent to the defeated Amhara 
group that they could trust the victors for not abusing their privileged position, at least not 
beyond a certain point determined by their remaining ability to fight back. This type of 
strategy, advocated in particular by Machiavelli in 1513 (Machiavelli, 1961), has been 
analyzed by Azam (2004) using the tools of modern conflict theory. 
 The Case of Redeployment of the Rebels’ Troops 
 We can take into account a similar kind of arrangement in a simple extension of the 
model of the previous section. Assume now that the rebel group is not asked to disarm 
entirely, but to redeploy instead part of its troops as a defense force D, as a contribution to the 
deterrence of the government’s predatory behavior. Then, D is supposed to be added to I to 
form the variable that reduces the government’s probability of predation. We now have: 
 
 ( )DILL +−= αθπ , with probability ν , 
and 
 ( )DIHH +−= αθπ , with probability ν−1 . 
 
 These two expressions show that the contribution demanded from the rebel group to 
enhance its own security enables the intervener to reach the same level of the probabilities of 
predation at a lower cost. However, this change increases obviously the cost of peace to the 
rebel group. The latter’s participation constraint must now be written as: 
 
( ) ( )TFyFyTDy GGGRR ψγψµπ −−−+−≥−− 1 .     
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 This can be rewritten as: 
 
 
( )
T
D
T
F
T
Ty GG
−
+
+
+
−≤
µ
ψγµψπ 11 .     (7) 
 
 Define Dπ  as the right-hand side of (7), i.e. the upper bound on π beyond which the 
rebels will not stop the fighting, even if they can keep the defense force D. Notice that it is 
quite naturally lower than the upper bound given in (2), ceteris paribus, as the latter increases 
the cost of peace. However, this may be compensated in equilibrium by the reduction in the 
probability of predation afforded by the defense force. 
 By contrast, the lower bound on the probability of predation that the government is 
prepared to accept in case of peace Gπ , given by (3) above, is unaffected by this change in the 
model. 
 Comparing (7) to (3) shows that we can write: 
 
 
T
DFG
GD µ
µ
ππ
−
+= .       (8) 
 
 This expression puts an upper bound on the size of the defense force that can be 
demanded from the rebel group, which has to be lower than the forces engaged in fighting for 
peace to be possible ( µGFD ≤ ). In this sense, the redeployment of forces analyzed in this 
section involves also some disarmament, at least in a relative sense. 
 Now, we want to show that this type of armed peace enlarges the set of parameter 
values for which the foreign power may choose to intervene for securing peace. In order to 
prove this point, let us choose as a starting point a case where no intervention is profitable for 
the foreign power in the absence of a positive D. Assume that 1<Vα . This condition means 
that the investment made in peace keeping has a low rate of return in terms of political gain. It 
either has little impact on the probability of looting in case of peace, or the peace accord has 
low political value for the foreign power. 
 Let us now look for an equilibrium where intervention takes place, and is successful in 
stopping the fighting with probability 1, to see whether this can be achieved in this setting by 
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using a positive level of D. For this to happen, we want the two probabilities Lπ  and Hπ to 
fall within the range [ ]DG ππ , , while the intervener’s profit is non negative. Using (8), this 
requires that the three following conditions hold: 
 
 ( )DI
T
DF
H
G
G +−≥
−
+ αθ
µ
µ
π ,      (9) 
 ( ) GL DI παθ ≥+− ,        (10) 
and: 
 ( ) ( ) IVVD ααθ −≥+− 11 ,       (11) 
where: 
 ( ) HL θνθνθ −+= 1 . 
 
Conditions (9) and (10) ensure that the government’s probability of predation falls 
within the relevant range in case of intervention, while (11) ensures that the intervention is 
worthwhile for the foreign power, being more profitable than staying put4. Notice that all 
these conditions define some straight lines in the { }DI ,  space that can be used to determine 
the admissible set. Assuming that LG θπ < , it is easily checked that the set defined by the 
three constraints (9) through (11) is not empty if: 
 
 
( )
V
VGL
α
θ
α
πθ
−
−
≤
−
1
1
 and GH L
F
T
θ θ
µ
− < .     (12) 
 These conditions are sufficient, but not necessary. What they imply is that (i) 
intervention always leaves a positive political profit to the intervener and (ii) constraint (9) 
lies below (10) in the { }DI ,  space, in the relevant range, thus leaving a non empty set of 
points between the two.  
 Then, it is especially easy to compute the equilibrium outcome in the particular case 
where T1=α  and: 
 
 G H G
F
T
θ π
µ
< − . 
                                                 
4 Whether it is preferable to the low-cost intervention presented below is discussed there. 
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 Under these two simplifying assumptions, the profit-maximizing choice made by the 
intervener for securing the peace with probability 1 has: 
 
 H G GFI θ π
α µ
−
= −   and G H LFD θ θ
µ α
−
= − .     (13) 
 Notice that the latter is positive under condition (12). This proves that under these 
conditions, substituting the redeployment of the rebel forces to the disarmament objective 
allows to find a profitable intervention, even if the intervener attaches a fairly small value to 
the political benefit of success, and has a low influence on the government’s probability of 
predation.  
Low-Cost Intervention with Redeployment 
However, this is not necessarily the optimal intervention for the foreign power, which 
might as well choose to intervene for securing peace only if the government was of the L-
type, i.e. with probability ν . This can be achieved very cheaply by the foreign power, by 
investing even less resources than in (13). Let 0>= εI  denote the small amount of resources 
invested by the intervener. Then, peace is secured if the government happens to be of the L-
type if: 
 
 
α
εαπθ −−
=
GLD . 
 
 Then, the intervener’s profit becomes: 
 
 ( ) επν −− VG1 , 
 
which is positive provided ε  is low enough.  
 This risky intervention may thus be more profitable for the intervener than the 
previous one, which aimed at success with probability 1. It can be checked easily that the 
following condition precludes this: 
 
 ( )( ) GHG V πθαπν −>−− 11 .      (14) 
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This condition can be compared to (6), in the previous section. It is not innocuous if 
1<Vα , as assumed in the present section. It requires that the probability of the government 
being of the worst type is quite high, while that government has nevertheless a low enough 
propensity to predate. However, this is just a sufficient condition derived by deleting from the 
difference in the intervener’s profit function in the two outcomes a lot of positive terms. 
Hence, the sure-cease-fire outcome may be preferred even if (14) does not hold. 
Of course, this example only has an illustrative purpose, and the special parameter 
values chosen to compute it can only be defended on the ground of their simplicity. 
Nevertheless, it shows that an equilibrium intervention is possible, under some conditions, 
where the foreign power does not aim at obtaining the rebels’ full disarmament, but pursues 
the more modest goal of securing peace by their partial disarmament combined with some 
redeployment of their forces. The benefit obtained in such a way is that the constraint 
imposed by the weak credibility of the government’s commitment to refrain from predation 
can be relaxed to some extent. This enlarges the intervener’s opportunity set, and turns peace 
making into a more tractable endeavor.  
In the real world, the difficult part of the peace-making strategy examined in the 
present section is to maintain a clear distinction between the armed rebels as fighters and the 
same ones turned into non-fighting deterrence forces. This probably entails a change in their 
weaponry, and in their location, under the control of the intervener. This might in fact put a 
lower bound on the useful size of the intervention. The Chadian and Ethiopian examples 
given at the beginning of this section suggest that this can be achieved. However, in these two 
examples, the war stopped only when one of the sides had been clearly defeated, so that the 
redeployment of its troops, rather than a full-blown demobilization, was perceived as a highly 
significant gesture. Some interesting lessons can also be drawn from the case of Côte d’Ivoire 
in the wake of the September 2002 mutiny. There, the two sides remained armed, and the 
resulting violence was very limited. This was largely due to the presence of the French forces, 
under a UN mandate, later increased by some UN soldiers. The skirmish when the 
government’s forces attacked the French troops in November 2004, killing nine soldiers, 
suggests that the Ivorian government wanted to test the French resolve. The latter’s response, 
Jean-Paul Azam : Imported Peace 23
which destroyed entirely the Ivorian air force, seems to have established their credibility. 
Afterwards, the occasional eruption of violence between the two sides did not involve regular 
troops from the southern side, but only armed militias, that the government could pretend not 
to control. Nevertheless, this example shows that a cease fire between two armed groups 
seems more fragile than the type of armed peace that followed the defeat of the Chadian 
Codos rebels or the Ethiopian Derg government in the two examples cited above.  
 
5. Aid as an Incentive for Peace Keeping 
 
 The previous section has shown the potential benefit for the intervener of combining a 
second instrument with the investment performed in peace-keeping proper, namely sharing 
the cost of protecting the disarming side against the government’s predatory behavior. In that 
case, the intervener is facing a lower cost of intervention, while the rebels are paying a 
fraction of the cost of maintaining peace. The present section looks at another potential 
combination of instruments, whereby the intervener is using another second instrument, 
namely aid, as an incentive for the government to accept the peace despite a lower prospect of 
levying a tribute from the former rebels. The foreign power is assumed to offer to the 
government the following contract: “I will give you a if you refrain from predating on the 
disarmed rebels”. This assumes that the intervener’s commitment to withdraw aid in case of 
the government’s infringement is fully credible. This is the usual assumption in the theoretical 
aid literature, although the threat of withdrawal usually concerns some other promises by the 
recipient government (see e.g. Azam and Laffont, 2003). However, this assumption has been 
discussed by Svensson (2003), who shows how the threat of withdrawal of aid can be made 
credible, by different methods. 
 The transfer of aid to the government, conditional upon the latter refraining from 
predation, is affecting directly the latter’s incentives. Its participation constraint can now be 
derived from the following inequality condition: 
 
 ( )( )1G G G Gy T F a y T Fπ γ ψ γ+ − + ≥ − + − . 
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 The left-hand side of this expression is the government’s expected profit in case of 
peace, including the aid flow. The right-hand side represents its expected profit in case of war, 
taking due account of the probability ψ  of loosing everything. Hence, peace is preferred to 
war if the former is larger than the latter. A close look at the former shows that aid is affecting 
the government’s profit in case of peace as a substitute to predation. In other words, the 
intervener is in a position to compensate the government for its restraint, by paying for the 
foregone tribute5. 
 This participation constraint can be rewritten as: 
 
 1 G Ga
y T F a
T T T
ψ γ
π π ψ +≥ = − + − .      (15) 
 
 This expression can be compared to (3), showing that aid is simply shifting Gπ  
downwards, thus enlarging the admissible set. This makes a cease-fire easier to obtain, as can 
be seen by working out the conditions for the latter to be reached with probability 1, i.e. 
where the peace settlement is achieved irrespective of the government’s type. Assume again 
that 1Vα < , as in the previous section, and that L R Hθ π θ< < , as well as R G H Lπ π θ θ< + − . 
The analysis performed in section 3 has already shown that this set of assumptions is ruling 
out the existence of a probability 1 peace accord without aid. By contrast, the following 
exercise shows that this can be achieved by combining aid with the disarmed rebels’ 
protection. 
 In this case, where the peace accord is obtained irrespective of the government’s type, 
the intervener’s expected profit becomes: 
 
 ( ) ( )1 I V I aθ α− + − + . 
 
 Hence, the intervener will in fact choose a policy mix { },I a  that minimizes 
( )1 V I aα− +  subject to the two constraints: 
 
 R H Iπ θ α≥ − , 
                                                 
5 Azam and Saadi-Sedik (2004) provide a more general treatment of the closely related problem of the choice 
between aid and sanctions for taming an oppressive government.  
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and 
 L aIθ α π− ≥ , 
 
where aπ  is as defined in (15), above.  
 Because both I and a are costly to the intervener, the latter will choose its policy mix 
{ },I a  so that both constraints are binding. It follows immediately that: 
 
 * H RI θ π
α
−
=  and ( )*a R H Lπ π θ θ= − − . 
 This is achieved by granting the following amount of aid: 
 
 ( ) ( )* 1 *a G Ga T y T Fπ ψ γ= − − + − . 
 
 
Figure 4: A Certain-Cease-Fire Equilibrium with Aid. 
 
 Figure 4 illustrates this equilibrium, using a similar framework to that used in section 
3. Therefore, given some assumed conditions that rule out the achievement of a certain cease 
fire using the rebels’ protection only, as in section 3, this section has shown that combining 
aid with the latter is liable to make such an equilibrium outcome possible. Hence, this exercise 
can also be viewed as a contribution to the theory of aid. It shows that the latter’s potential 
contributions should not be restricted to the pursuit of the first of the Millennium 
Lθ  
Rπ  
Hθ  
*aπ  
H Rθ π
α
−
I  
Gπ  
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Development Goals (MDGs), namely reducing poverty, as a widespread view would see it. In 
fact, it is also a potent tool for achieving the second MDG, namely reducing the incidence of 
war. This possibility is unfortunately ignored by the so-called “aid-ineffectiveness” literature, 
which restricts its attention to the impact of aid on growth and poverty alleviation. A more 
subtle view of the impact of aid is supported by the present exercise. 
  
6. Conclusion 
 
 This short paper has emphasized the problem of commitment failure as an obstacle to 
the conclusion of a peace settlement in a civil war. A simple model has been presented, where 
the outcome is largely driven by the probability of the government adopting a predatory 
behavior in case of peace, in response to the rebels disarming. Fighting might go on in this 
model either because this probability is too high, in which case the rebels do not want to take 
the risk of peace, or because it is too small. In the latter case, it is the government who rejects 
the peace settlement, which then promises a lower expected payoff than war. The role of the 
foreign intervention in this model is to change that probability, by investing some resources 
with a view to exert some restraint on the government ability or willingness to indulge in 
predation on the former rebel group in case of peace. However, the intervener cannot go too 
far in building this mechanism of restraint, as this might destroy the government’s incentive to 
accept the peace settlement, beyond a certain point. Extending the model by adding aid to the 
intervener’s toolkit shows how the latter constraint can be relaxed further. 
The model assumes that the two local players, the government and the rebels, have a 
perfect knowledge of all the parameters of the model, while the potential intervener’s position 
is made weaker by asymmetric information. The latter explains why this foreign power may 
intervene in some cases while its probability of success is less than 1. Two simple examples 
of the latter case have been discussed. In the first one, the intervention succeeds in preventing 
a government with a high propensity to predate from doing so, but it fails to convince a more 
moderate government of accepting the peace accord. The reason for that partial failure is due 
to the fact that the more moderate government sees its predation prospect reduced too 
drastically in case of peace, making war more attractive. In the second of these examples, the 
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peace settlement might be rejected by the rebels instead, if the government happens to have a 
high propensity to predate. In this case, the foreign intervention succeeds in convincing a 
government with a low propensity to predate to settle for peace, but the investment done for 
buying this agreement is too low for reducing enough the damage threatened implicitly by a 
government with a higher propensity to predate. Then, the rebels prefer going on with the 
fighting, which gives them a better expected payoff.  
A final example has been analyzed with the simple model, where the intervention is 
fully successful. Disarmament of the rebels is obtained in this case with probability one. This 
case was shown to be liable to occur in particular when the rebels are not highly efficient at 
fighting. Then, even if the probability of the government adopting a predatory behavior in 
case of peace is quite high, the expected damage may remain lower than the cost of the 
continuation of the war. 
The subsequent section has shown that disarmament, strictly speaking, is probably an 
unnecessarily restrictive goal to pursue with a peace-making intervention in a civil war, using 
a simple extension of the previous model. Some room for maneuver can be usefully gained by 
aiming at redeployment of the rebel forces instead, turning some of the fighters into a non-
fighting deterrence force. The benefit so acquired is that this may reduce the government’s 
probability of predation, thus making a peace accord easier to accept by the two parties, while 
it reduces the cost of intervention. A second extension was also presented, showing how aid 
can profitably be brought in to bear on the outcome, making a peace settlement easier to 
obtain. The promise of aid, conditional upon the government restraining from predation, 
enlarges the set of acceptable outcomes for the government, thus making peace easier to 
establish. These two extensions are in fact simple applications of the so-called “Tinbergen’s 
Principle”, which can be expressed roughly as follows: “you need at least as many stones as 
there are birds that you want to kill”. One of the present model’s contributions is precisely to 
show that that there are at least two participation constraints to fulfill for getting a peace 
accord, so that you need at least two instruments in most cases.  
This model is certainly highly stylized, and many relevant features of the real world 
have been left out. In particular, the game takes place here in one shot, while some additional 
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problems are raised in the real world by the repetition of broken cease fires, and fake 
settlements. Reputation effects are bound to be relevant in such cases, which the present 
model is unable to address. However, the latter sheds some interesting light on the issue of 
credibility and commitment, which is potentially one of the central effects of foreign 
intervention in civil war. It shows that fine tuning should be the rule, rather than an all-or-
nothing approach. Realism should command to leave some room for maneuver in a post-
conflict situation, for both the government and the potential rebels to have a stake in the end 
of the fighting. The model also explains why the foreign power may rationally intervene, 
while its action turns out to be a failure ex post. This is done under the rational expectations 
assumption, and does not require any ad hoc reference to irrationality or underestimation of 
the risks involved. This suggests that a dynamic version of the model could shed some light 
on the issue raised by Regan (2000.b), suggesting that some interventions end up lengthening 
the duration of an ongoing conflict, rather than helping to put an end to it. This suggests 
another guidepost that an extension of the model to a repeated-game framework should take 
into account.  
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